Abstract
I reflect on religious influence in the social role of military officers in a liberal democracy. One feature that defines that social role is command authority: constitutive of being an officer in the military is having the authority to issue orders that generate moral and legal obligations that are binding on subordinates. These orders can be quite coercive: disobedience can be punished by fines, demotion, imprisonment, expulsion, and the like. Given its impact on the well-being of subordinates, an officer ought to exercise command authority over others only given adequate reason to do so. But what counts as an adequate reason? Might a religious reason qualify? Correlatively, as state officials, may military officers determine how to exercise command authority by having recourse to their religious convictions? Must they restrain themselves from using their authority in ways that depend decisively on their faith commitments? No: although the exercise of command authority ought to be constrained in various important ways – liberal values, relevant legislation, military regulation, and superior orders, military officers may be guided by their faith commitments as they exercise command authority within those constraints. More particularly, an officer may direct an order to subordinates, and thereby bind them morally and legally, even though that order depends decisively for its justification on a religious rationale. I will explicate and defend these claims by reflecting on a number of cases from recent military history: Prayer in Ramadi, Abortion in Diego Garcia, and Tactics in Fallujah.
Presenters
Christopher EberleProfessor of Philosophy, United States Naval Academy, Maryland, United States
Details
Presentation Type
Paper Presentation in a Themed Session
Theme
KEYWORDS
Religion and War, Liberalism, Religious Restraint
