Abstract
In the paradigmatically humanistic discipline of philosophy, moral blame is often connected to character flaws. The person is responsible for their character as they freely make choices that determine the nature of their own character. In this paper, we discuss some classical virtues, following in the tradition of virtue ethics, and we then consider how mental illness can interfere with free choice and so normative character development. We do this by providing a phenomenology of two mental illnesses: anxiety and depression. If we are right in our analysis, the philosophical theory of virtue must be supplemented by abnormal psychology in order to see if human agents are truly responsible for their own character. In the final section of the essay we reflect on the implications of our analysis for moral education and the humanities/social science. In order to reach full agency, adolescents must be capable of normative character development. If mental illness inhibits this development, we cannot expect the resulting adults to be fully responsible for their character and this conclusion has many important implications for the concept and reality of moral blame.
Presenters
John PauleyProfessor, Philosophy, Simpson College, Iowa, United States Ava Carnes
Student, Bachelors, Simpson College, Iowa, United States Jack Campbell
Student, Political Science/Music, Simpson College, Iowa, United States
Details
Presentation Type
Paper Presentation in a Themed Session
Theme
Civic, Political, and Community Studies
KEYWORDS
Mental Illness, Moral Blame, Phenomenology, Character, Moral Education
